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DARWINISM AND SOCIOLOGY.^
Summary.—This paper seeks to supply evidence in the direction of
showing (a) that it is illegitimate to deduce the nature and degree of the
innate mental capacities of a people or person from the stage of culture
which either occupies; (6) that all peoples and (soundly-bom) individuals
appear to be equally adapted by nature to the highest level of culture
existing to-day; (c) that (a) and (b) are explicable by man's essential and
unique dependence on socio-historically developed and preserved material
and other inventions and discoveries, and by the fact that all species are
virtually stable and uniform so far as innate capacities and short
periods are concerned; (d) that if (a) to (c) be granted, sociology is
provided with a virtually constant unit and with a basic explanation
of social statics and dynamics; and (e) that it is highly desirable that
systematic investigations be instituted into the influence of the cultural
environment in producing the various individual and collective cultural
characteristics and achievements.
DARWIN and his followers, believing that the two factors which
accounted for the process of evolution in the animal and vegetable
kingdoms were the selection by the environment of spontaneous
and acquired structural modifications, tacitly assumed that the
laws of human progress were those of animal progression. His
I>escent of Man is crowded with illustrations to this effect. Here
are, for instance, some passages culled almost at random :-—
We can see, that in the rudest state of society, the individuals who
were the most sagacious, who invented and used the best weapons or
traps, and who were best able to defend themselves, would rear the
greatest number of ofispring At the present day, civilised
nations are everywhere supplanting barbarous nations, excepting where
climate opposes a deadly barrier; anH they succeed mainly, though not
exclusively, through their arts, which are the product of intellect. It
is, therefore, highly probable that with mankind the intellectual faculties
have been mainly and gradually perfected through natural selection; and
this conclusion is sufficient for our purpose, (p. 128.)
If some one man in a tribe, more sagacious than the others,
invented a new snare or weapon, or other means of attack or defence, the
plainest self-interest, without the assistance of much reasoning power,
would prompt the other members to imitate him; and all would thus
profit. The habitual practice of each new art must likewise in some
slight degree strengthen the intellect. If the new invention were an
important one, the tribe would increase in number, spread, and supplant
other tribes. In a tribe thus rendered more numerous there would always
be a rather greater chance of the birth of other superior and inventive
members. If such men left children to inherit their mental superiority,
the chance of the birth of still more ingenious members would be some-
what better, and in a very small tribe decidedly better. Even if they
left no children, the tribe would still include their blood relations; and
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it has been ascertained by agriculturists that by preserving and breed-
ing from the family of an animal, which when slaughtered was found to
be valuable, the desired character has been obtained, (p. 129.)
As the reasoning powers and foresight of the members became
improved, each man would soon learn that if he aided his fellow men,
he would commonly receive aid in return. From this low motive he
might acquire the habit of aiding his fellows; and the habit of perform-
ing benevolent actions certainly strengthens the feeling of sympathy
which gives the first impulse to benevolent actions. Habits, moreover,
followed during many generations proEably tend to be inherited,
(pp. 130-31.)
Human progress is in this manner explained to be due to struc-
tural modifications passed on from generation to generation.
Accordingly, Darwin encouraged the notion of improving the
human race as we improve our cattle: —
With savages, the weak in body or mind are soon eliminated; and
those that survive commonly exhibit a vigorous state of health. We
civilised men, on the other hand, do our utmost to check the process
of elimination; we build asylums for the imbecile, the maimed and the
sick; we institute poor-laws; and our medical men exert their utmost
skill to save the life of everyone to the last moment. There is reason
to believe that vaccination has preserved thousands, who from a weak
constitution would formerly have succumbed to small-pox. Thus the
weak members of civilised societies propagate their kind. No one who
has attended to the breeding of domestic animals will doubt that this
must be highly injurious to the race of man. It is surprising how soon
a want of care, or care wrongly directed, leads to the degeneration of a
domestic race; but, excepting in the case of man himself, hardly anyone
is so ignorant as to allow his worst animals to breed, (pp. 133-4.)
On this theme Darwinians have been incessantly enlarging.
Professor Ridgeway, for instance, contends that " what is true of
master races in relation to inferior races, is equally true of
individuals in each community. The middle and upper classes
are in the main sprung from ancestors with better physique, courage
and morale " (Proceedings of the British Association, 1908, p. 845).
And from this he characteristically concludes : " The legislator
must not merely look to improved housing of the poor and the
development of the physique of city populations. He must, as far
as possible, conform to the principles of the stockbreeder, whose
object is to rear the finest horses, cattle or sheep. . . . The legis-
lator, on his part, ought similarly to favour the increase of the best
elements in the State, and on the other hand discourage the multipli-
cation of the worst " (ibid., p. 846). So one of Darwin's sons :
" I f we tell the breeders of cattle that their knowledge of the
laws of heredity is so imperfect that it is useless for them either
to attempt or to avoid breeding from their worst stocks or to try
only to breed from their best stocks, why they would simply laugh
at us; and the number of those who now see matters as regards
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mankind in the same light is steadily increasing " (Major Leonard
Darwin, in Problems in Eugenics, 1912, p. 5). Or take a typical
passage from another writer : " Man is an organism—an animal,
and the laws of improvement of corn and of race horses hold true
for him also. Unless people accept this simple truth and let it
influence marriage selection," continues this prophetic author,
"human progress will cease" (C. B. Davenpyort, Heredity in
Relation to Eugenics, 1912, p. i). The Darwinian point of view,
we see, was regarded as embodying a natural law to doubt which
was mid-summer madness.
Taking this theory of progress at its face value, we should
expect the innumerable cultural differences between peoples to be
due to differences in native capacity, and the stages from the
Australian aborigines to the English scholar to indicate the real
path of the progressive development of the human species. This
conclusion was therefore unhesitatingly adopted by Darwin and his
followers, and every difference in intelligence, sympathy, and
strength of will was referred to disparity in native outfit. Let us
hear Darwin : —
As man is a social animal, it is almost certain that he would inherit
a tendency to be faithful to his comrades, and obedient to the leader of
his tribe; for these qualities are common to most social animals. He
would consequently possess some capacity for self-command. He would
from an inherited tendency be willing to defend, in concert with others,
his fellow men; and would be ready to aid them in any way, which did
not too greatly interfere with his own welfare or his own strong desires
(p. 109).
Here obvious cultural factors are ascribed to hereditary influences.
Again :
It is evident, in the first place, that with mankind the instinctive
impulses have difEerent degrees of strength; a savage will risk his own
life to save that of a member of the same community, but will be wholly
indifferent about a stranger : a young and timid mother urged by the
maternal instinct will, without a moment's hesitation, run the greatest
danger for her own infant, but not for a mere fellow-creature. Never-
theless many a civilised man, or even boy, who never before risked his
life for another, but full of courage and sympathy, has disregarded the
instinct of self-preservation, and plunged at once into a torrent to save
a drowning man, though a stranger. . . . Such actions as the above
appear to be the simple result of the greater strength of the social or
maternal instincts than that of any other instinct or motive (p. no).
Such was Darwin's theory of human progress. How far is it
borne out by the facts ? In a recent article in the Sociological
Review (Oct., 1913), on " The Mentality of the Australian
Aborigines," I endeavoured to show that the Australian native
cannot be said to be, so far as the evidence carries us, especially
that relating to education, in any assignable way lower than or
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different from the European branch of humanity. If this be the case,
then—since the uneducated Australian admittedly stands on about the
lowest rung of the cultural ladder—the Darwinian interpretation
of the relation of culture to culturability is proved to lack any kind
of material support in fact. Startling as the conclusion may be that
cultural influence alone accounts for culture, it is difficult to imagine
how it can be avoided. Should further investigation uphold or
strengthen it. Sociology will have calculable and verifiable factors
of a universal nature—a scientific unit—for its basis. It is the
object of this paper to supply a certain amount of evidence of this
character.
(A) The Senses. Since the senses occupy an intermediate
position between the body and mind it would be, on the Darwinian
assumption, reasonable to believe that they are more or less highly
developed according to the needs of a people. That considerable
innate differences exist was taken for granted, travellers telling
marvellous stories of the sensory feats performed by the least
civilised peoples. Darwin unambiguously says on this point:
" The inferiority of Europeans, in comparison with savages, in
eye-sight and other senses, is no doubt the accumulated and trans-
mitted effect of lessened use during many generations" (p. 3;^).
Compare with this statement what three experienced psycholo-
gists write :—
The results of the Cambridge Expedition to the Torres Straits have
shown that in acuteness of vision, hearing, smell, etc., these people are
not noticeably different from our own. We conclude that the remarkable
tales adduced to the contrary by various travellers are to be explained,
not by the acuteness of sensation, but by the acuteness of interpretation
of primitive peoples. Take the savage into the streets of a busy city,
and see what a number of sights and sounds he will neglect because of
their meaninglessness to him. Take the sailor whose powers of discern-
ing a ship on the horizon appear to the landsman so extraordinary, and
set him to detect micro-organisms in the field of a microscope. Is it then
surprising that primitive man should be able to draw inferences, which
to the stranger appear marvellous, from the merest specks in the far
distance or from the faintest sounds, odours, or tracks in the jungle?
Such behaviour serves only to attest the extraordinary powers of
observation in primitive man with respect to things which are of use
and hence of interest to him. The same powers are shown in the vast
number of words he will coin to denote the same object, say a certain
tree at different stages of its growth. We conclude, then, that no funda-
mental difference in powers of sensory acuity, nor, indeed, in sensory
discrimination, exists between primitive and civilised communities.
(Charles S. Myers, " On the Permanence of Racial Mental Differences,"
in Inter-Racial Problems, ed. by G. Spiller, 1911, p. 74.)
Dr. and Mrs. Seligman, in The Veddas, 1911, p. 399, say:
" Comparison with the figures obtained in other countries shows
that there is little difference between Veddas and other races" in
C
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respei:t of visual acuity, though they perform feats in this connec-
tion which astonish the European visitor.
Professor R. S. Woodworth, who examined the many represen-
tatives of primitive peoples brought to the St. Louis Exhibition, con-
cluded : " On the whole, the keenness of the senses seems to be
about on a par in the various races of mankind " (" Racial Differ-
enci-s in Mental Traits," in Science, Feb. 4, 1910).
We may therefore take it for granted that even in respect of the
senses the Darwinian theory of human progress appears inapplic-
able to the races of man.
(B) Temperament. According to Darwin and his followers the
observable temperamental differences in races are expressions of
innate dispositions. Speaking of races, Darwin says :-—
Their mental characteristics are . . . very distinct; chiefly as it
would appear in their emotional, but partly in their intellectual, faculties.
Everyone who has had the opportunity of comparison, must have been
struck with the contrast between the taciturn, even morose, aborigines
of S. America and the light-hearted, talkative negroes. There is a nearly
similar contrast between the Malays and the Papuans, who live under
the same physical conditions, and are separated from each other only
by a narrow space of sea. (pp. 167-68.)
Here again experimental psychologists have been at work, though
not so assiduously. Mr. R. R. Marett says on this point: —
As judged simply by his emotions, man is very much alike every-
where, from China to Peru. They are all there in germ, though different
customs and grades of culture tend to bring special types of feelings to
the fore. Indeed a certain paradox is to be noted here. The negro, one
would naturally say, is in general more emotional than the white man.
Yet some experiments conducted by Miss Keller of Chicago on negresses
and white women, by means of the test of the effect of emotion on
respiration, brought out the former as decidedly the more stolid of the
two. And, whatever be thought of the value of such methods of proof,
certain it is that the observers of rude races incline to put down most of
them as apathetic, when not tuned up to concert-pitch by a dance or
other social event. It may well be, then, that it is not the hereditary
temperament of the negro, so much as the habit which he shares with
other peoples at the same level of culture, of living and acting in a
crowd, that accounts for his apparent excitability. But after all,
" maflSeking " is not unknown in civilised countries. Thus the quest
for a race-mark of a mental kind is barren once more. (Anthropology,
1912, pp. 91-2.)
And Dr. Myers, Lecturer in Experimental Psychology in the
University of Cambridge, whom we have already quoted, states : —
In temperament we meet with just the same variations in primitive as
in civilised communities. In every primitive society is to be found the
flighty, the staid, the energetic, the indolent, the cheerful, the morose,
the even, the hot-tempered, the unthinking, the philosophical individual.
(Op. cit., p. 74.)
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So far as direct evidence has been collected, it leans therefore
in the direction of pointing to the equality of the temperamental
outfit in different races, the actual divergences being attributable to
cultural circumstances. When one notes, for example, how French
English people become who settle in France, and how English
French people turn who take up their abode in England, especially
the second and following generations, one is bound to ask for the
most unexceptionable evidence before admitting that differences in
temperament are inborn. In this connection it should be worth
while studying the temperaments of those who were adopted as
infants by men or women of a different class and living in a
different part of the world to the parents who are never communi-
cated with. The Jews, settled in different countries, offer the most
striking exemplification of race adaptability, particularly where
they do not live segregated socially, spiritually, and philologically.
Whilst corroborative evidence for the culture theory of tempera-
ment is desirable, there is little doubt in regard to the results of new
investigations.
(C) Variability. Dr. Woodworth says on this point: " The
dead level of intelligence which is sometimes supposed to obtain
among lower races is not borne out by psychological tests, since
individual differences are abundantly found among all races, and,
indeed, the variability of different groups seems, from these tests,
to be about on a par." (Op. cit., p. 185.) The assumption of the
existence of differences in variability receives, therefore, no support
from experimental psychology.
(D) Inhibition of Impulses, Concentration, and Originality.
Here also, so far as concentration is concerned. Prof. Woodworth's
valuable investigations suggest that " if psychological tests are put
in such form as to appeal to the interests of the primitive man, he
can be relied upon for sustained attention." (Op. cit., p. 180.)
We will further quote on these points, three short passages from
Professor F. Boas' The Mind of Primitive Man, 1911, expressing
at the same time regret that lack of space forbids reproducing his
apposite and convincing illustrations :
It is an impression obtained by many travellers, and also based upon
experiences gained in our own country, that primitive man of all races,
and the less educated of our own race, have in common a lack of control
of the emotions, that they give way more readily to an impulse than
civilized man and the highly educated. I btelieve that this conception is
based largely upon the neglect to consider the occasions on which a strong
control of impulses is demanded in various forms of society (p. 106).
Related to the lack of powtr of inhibition is another trait which has been
ascribed to primitive man of all races,—his inability of concentration
when any demand is made upon the more complex faculties of the intel-
lect. I will mention an example which seems to make clear the error
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committed in this assumption (p. no). Originality is a trait which is
by no means lacking in the life of primitive people (p. 112).
The available evidence points thus unmistakably to the cultural
interpretation of whatever differences in practical capacity may be
noticeable among various peoples.
(E) Mental Capacity and Mental Modifiability. If we look
upon man as being just one among many animals, we are bound to
assume not only that cultural differences presuppose innate differ-
ences, but that these innate differences can only be modified with
difficulty and after the lapse of centuries. Thus the cultural
influences acting on a particular generation should be virtually nil
in effect because of the resistance of inherited aptitudes (see F), and
if the cultural development contemplated be extensive, ages upon
ages should, on this theory, pass before they are realised. To take
a concrete case for example. The Australian parent being
thousands of years culturally removed from the English parent, we
should expect that the child of the Australian if sent to school would
utterly fail in approaching in performance the English child. Or
to be even more precise. In view of his parents not being able to
count above four, the Australian's child should stop there in his
arithmetic lessons. After a severe selective process lasting for
centuries its distant successor might be able to count up 10 fifty.
Yet, as was shown in the article mentioned on p.234, without the
mediation of natural selection or the inheritance of acquired modi-
fications, the attainments and mental powers of the children of the
Australian aborigines appear to be, according to one officially
published report, "age for age and opportunity for oppor-
tunity, equal . . . . to the average white children.""^ And the
modifiability does not extend only to the primary school; it reaches
to the highest institutions—the law courts, the medical college, the
engineering school, and the university. At the present moment
about a hundred Africans are pursuing their studies in these abodes
of learning in England, and if the social conditions in Africa be
duly taken into account the number does not appear to be
smaller than we should expect if the Africans were of English
stock but were brought up as Africans in Africa. If we add to
this that these young Africans appear to have neither more nor less
difficulty than their European fellow-students in obtaining their
degrees or diplomas, it follows that the Darwinian assumption of
profound or even appreciable innate differences between races is in
I. This was true even of the Tasmanians : " ' The master informs me
that with some exceptions these aboriginal children are not inferior in
capacitj' to European children.' " (H. Ling Roth, The Aborigines of
Tasmania, 1899, p. 25.)
DARWINISM AND SOCIOLOGY 2 3 9
a very parlous state.^ In fact, nothing of what should happen,
according to the Darwinian theory, does happen, and nothing that
does happen but is in flat contradiction with the theory.
The school and college form an excellent crucible in which to
test race theories. The modifiability extends, however, to com-
munities as a whole. Of the Torres Straits tribes Dr. A. C.
Haddon (Report of the Cam,bridge Anthropological Expedition to
Torres Straits, vol. 5, 1904, p. 272) says : " Thirty years ago the
natives were absolutely naked and unashamed; now they have
become a people suffering from an exaggerated prudishness."
Whole sections of Indians who, according to the Darwinian theory,
should have a mentality of a quite peculiar caste, have taken to
European culture as a duck to the water, while at the same time they
have lost all sympathy and understanding for their own native
culture. (Consult, for instance. Dr. Coomaraswamy's Essays in
National Idealism,, where this is deplored.) The marvellous
changes which Japan has undergone during the last two genera-
tions have startled the West. From an excessively peace-loving
population it has transformed itself into a warrior race (J. Bertin, in
Sur le Congres des Races), while, as if by a magic wand, it has
developed its intellectual side to the extent of making first-rate
scientific contributions. More incredible still, that seemingly petri-
fied, immovable colossus China bids fair even to outdo Japan in the
cheerful readiness of venturously embarking on far-reaching poli-
tical, educational, judicial, industrial, and commercial changes, to
say nothing of a revolution in customs and manners. Here, if
anywhere, we should have surmised immobility, and yet here in
this oldest of modern countries we observe changes proceeding com-
pared to which our European efforts at reformation appear dwarf-
like and petty.
We may, therefore, regard it as abundantly attested, contrary to
Darwinian and eugenic views, that the different races of mankind
are for all intents and purposes indefinitely modifiable in their men-
tality, and that no known length of uniform environmental influence
leaves the slightest traceable impress on the innate mentality of
races. Evidently cultural antecedents alone count. It is these
which lend a people its mental and moral outlook. As these ante-
cedents are changed, so the cultural outlook freely passes into a new
phase. But for man's culturability, geographical and economic
influences are impotent to build up a civilisation.
(F) Instincts. Granted that man is indefinitely modifiable in
I. The contention that the frontal sutures of the so-called lower races
close earlier, is emphatically called in question by J. Frederic, " Unter-
suchungen fiber die normale Obliteration der Schadelnahte," in Zeitschr.
f. Morphologie, etc., 1906, pp. 444-5.
240 THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
his mentality, it follows that he cannot be supposed to be tyrannised
over by his instincts. These are defined by Mr. McDougall (An
Introduction to Social Psychology, 1907, p. 23) as " certain innate
specific tendencies of the mind that are common to all members of
any species, racial characters that have been slowly evolved in the
process of adaptation of species to their environment and that can
be neither eradicated from the mental constitution of which they
are innate elements nor acquired by individuals in the course of
their lifetime " (p. 23).
It may be accepted without demur that whilst an individual
human being has the power of deciding whether he shall live or die,
he must obey certain physiological and other demands if he chooses
to live. He must breathe, he must have warmth, he must eat, he
must exercise body and mind, and the like. But these, as well as
all the human instincts mentioned by McDougall, taken as such,
leave us emphatically on the animal or sub-human plane, i.e.,
without any culture, whilst all but the most fundamental animal
activities are in man easily modified or even suppressed. In this
modifiability, indeed, as we have seen, lies the principal charac-
teristic of human nature.
Such considerations, allowing that they can only be said to
apply properly to man's imperfect animal instincts, make one feel
that if nine-tenths in civilisation is a cultural product primarily,
nine-tenths at least of the remaining tenth may be modified in any
direction strongly desired by the community. It is therefore
possible that various secondary instincts indirectly related to
culture exist in man, but that they are so loosely rooted that the
stupendous force of social culture, when concentrated, readily
removes or controls them. Of the hereditary transmission of cultural
acquisitions there is, however, no trace, as (E) has shown. Indeed,
even so far as animals are concerned, " no instance of such inherit-
ance is forthcoming." (J. McCabe, Principles of Evolution, 1913,
p. 139. See also to the same effect Delage, L'Heredite, 1903, pp.
236-7.) The plastic character of man's animal instincts and the
absence of particular instinctive cultural needs, means, and methods
can alone account for man's indefinite and unique modifiability.
(G) Brain and Skull. Even the difference in certain important
physical respects appears to be minimal between races, for while,
according to Deniker, the average brain of the ape weighs 360
grammes and that of the average European 1,360, the average
Negro's weighs 1,316 (ranging from 1,013 to 1,587 grammes) and
that of the average Annamese 1,341 grammes. Human brains
appear to be extraordinarily variable in weight. " Virchow has
found a brain weighing 1,911 grammes in a man without any
specially high development, and the brains of some very able men
have been found below the average weight." (Chambers's Ency-
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clopcedia, article " Brain.") The brain weight of one individual
may thus be double that of another nearly without appreciable
difference in mental calibre. As Prof. W. I. Thomas says :
Viewed from the standpoint of brain weight, all races are, broadly
speaking, iu the same class. For while the relatively small series of
the brains from the black race examined by anthropologists shows a
slight inferiority in weight—about 45 grammes in negroes—when com-
pared with white brains, the yellow race shows more than a corresponding
superiority to the white; in the Chinese about 70 grammes.
The existence of appreciable differences in the mental constitution
of races cannot therefore be deduced from the known comparative
facts relating to the brain. The ascertained variations in brain
weight offer no standard for the measurement of innate mental and
moral quantities.
It is the same, apparently, as regards the skull, the brain's bony
shelter, for a study of ancient skulls suggests that primitive man—
or man since he has been man at all—was practically as well
furnished with brains as we moderns are. On this there seems to
be a consensus of opinion, as the following quotations from recently
published books show : " The cranial capacity of . . . some of
the most ancient human skulls is not less than that of the average
man of highly civilised race " (Ray Lankester, The Kingdom of
Man, 1912, p. 13). " Probably this creature [the distant ancestor
of paleolithic man] had nearly the full size of brain and every other
physical character of modern man " (Ibid, p. 12). " Some speci-
mens of Neanderthal man in sheer size of the brain cavity are said
to give points to any of our modern poets and politicians " (R. R.
Marett, Anthropology, 1912, p. 87). " Early paleolithic man was
furnished with a very adequate quantity of brain material, whatever
its quality may have been. In regard to the amount, no symptom
or sign of an inferior evolutionary status can be detected " (W. L.
Duckworth, Prehistoric Man, 1912, p. 45). The above considered
judgments are completely borne out by Dr. Arthur Keith's authori-
tative Ancient Types of Man, 1911.
(H) The Individual. If, as has been shown above, no conceiv-
able circumstances seem to affect the innate intellectual capacities
of a people; if every people is at any time ready to identify itself
with the farthest point thus far reached by the stream of civilisation ;
and if the vast cultural differences between peoples are purely social
products, what shall we say to the theory that every individual
differs in regard to the mentality with wkich he started life ? Mani-
festly, the same conclusion must be drawn, for if the Darwinian
theory did apply to the sf>ecial circumstances of individuals it would
ipso facto apply to the general circumstances of peoples (who are
composed of individuals), and if it is inapplicable to the latter it
must be inapplicable to the former. It is difficult to see how we
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are to escape from this magic circle, and it appears useless to
attempt the impossible feat. And, after all, if the prodigious dif-
ferences in the civilisations of various peoples leave them yet on the
same level so far as native capacity is concerned, need we shrink
from the obvious corollary that the enormous cultural differences
observable between individuals are due purely and solely to social
causes ? ' But what of men of genius, men of talent, average
men, and those below the average (leaving aside defectives who
are, together with those diseased, plainly abnormal), and what of
the differences noticeable in members of the same family, and
. . . ? ' The answer, according to the cultural view, is simple. Our
classification of individuals has been as faulty as that of peoples.
We have slurred over patent social influences in the one case as in
the other. We have tacitly posited occult causes where diligent
research would have revealed social explanations. We have been
so possessed and obsessed by the Darwinian theory—a mere revival
of an ancient guess (e.g., vide Plato's Republic), so far as the
problem of culture is involved—that we have ridden roughshod
over every principle of scientific method, defying the most elemen-
tary demands of scientific exactitude when it was a question of
explaining individual differences in mental, moral, and aesthetic
achievement. Let us, however, touch on the classes of individuals
recognised in current classifications.
(a) Men of Genius. Over and over again we find men of genius
appearing in clusters: ^schylus, Sophocles, and Euripides;
Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle; the age of Pericles; the Elizabethan
period adorned by Shakespeare and a double score of first-class
playwrights and innumerable poets; the host of eminent painters
grouped round Raphael and Michael Angelo; the Renaissance
generally; Bacon, Descartes, Locke, Leibnitz, Spinoza; Voltaire,
Diderot, Rousseau, D'Alembert; the outburst of great men of
science at the beginning of the nineteenth century; the grouping
of Beethoven, Bach, and other eminent musicians, in one
country and at one period; the German poetic group, Lessing,
Goethe, and Schiller; the German group of philosophers, Kant,
Hegel, Fichte, Schopenhauer; the English poets, Wordsworth,
Byron, Shelley, and Keats; the English novelists, Scott,
Thackeray, Dickens, Lytton, and George Eliot; and the English
inventors. Watts, Arkwright, and Stephenson. Considering, there-
fore, that by far the larger majority of the most eminent men and
women appears in groups, we must either posit showers of men of
genius (William James, The Will to Believe, 1897, P- 243) myste-
riously produced, or less picturesquely assume that social tendencies
lead to " genius " rising to the surface. There can be no doubt
which is the more likely explanation. We can thus easily under-
stand how a growing interest in astronomy gave us the Copernican
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theory, how continued interest in the subject focussed itself in
Kepler and Galileo, and how increased interest of the same nature
spread over the whole of Europe and culminated in the writing of
Newton's Principia. Ignore this social attitude and the group of
astronomers, as of poets, philosophers, and novelists, seems nothing
less than a miraculous production. We must say, therefore, that,
but for certain social causes, the groups referred to would not have
existed, and the individuals composing them would have led
uneventful lives leading to oblivion and not to fame.
Such is our first proposition. Our second is that the man of
genius as such is also explicable socially. Read Brewster's Life of
Newton, for example, and you will find it difficult to determine what
portion of the gravitation theory could be legitimately and unequi-
vocally attributed to Newton. As hinted above, this theory was
rapidly shaping itself, thanks to the labours of innumerable workers
in many countries, and Newton, one of the foremost of them, con-
ceived, just when the time was rijje, the plan of philosophically
summing up the whole of the work done on the subject. Or taEe
the case of Charles Darwin. Already Sir John Herschell, in his
Discourse, written by 1831, showed himself alive to the fact that the
geological record proved that the series of extinct plants and
animals embedded in the rocks were more and more highly deve-
loped the less ancient they were, the most recent resembling closely
the Hving flora and fauna, and the most ancient, by a series of
gradations, becoming strikingly different. Chambers's Vestiges
of Creation, published first in 1843, ran in a very few years through
numerous editions, showing that the day had come for the theory of
evolution. Agassiz, again, by 1851, as is shown by his Compara-
tive Physiology, was quite clear in regard to the appearance, though
not as to the reality, of the evolution of species as recorded by the
rocks; and Herbert Spencer had not a shadow of a doubt on the
subject, and began to elaborate the doctrine of evolution several
years before the Origin of Species was put on the book market in
1859. What is more, the " Darwinian " theory was simultaneously
discovered by Alfred Russel Wallace, showing that the new view of
the origin of life was inevitable. When Darwin then published
his Origin of Species, all the world was, figuratively speaking,
standing on tiptoe, ready to cry " 1 told you so " to anything he
had to say. Add to this his, as well as Wallace's, indebtedness to
Malthus for the causal idea, and it will be obvious that Darwin's
greatness is altogether a social product and accident.^ Instead of
these men of genius being thus the creators of world-moving ideas,
I. Further research has called into question so many of Darwin's prin-
cipal explanations of the evolutionary process that his claim to be a great
discoverer is practically annihilated. (See espedally Bateson's remark-
able volume. Problems of Genetics, 1913.)
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they prove to be philosophical summarisers and popularisers, and
if they seem to stand immeasurably higher than the average of
their fellows, it is because the hasty imagination attributes to them
the labours of an exceptionally active period. Proof could be piled
upon proof to demonstrate that this line of reasoning is correct, and
that men of genius, whether found inside or outside a group, owe
their pre-eminent position to social causes.^
The theory of heredity is only strong so long as it is not
analysed. Sir Francis Galton, for instance, in his well-known
Hereditary Genius, quotes fourteen eminent musicians who, he
alleges, had eminent relations. These fourteen might well be
reduced to six—Bach, Haydn, Mendelssohn, Meyerbeer, Mozart,
and Palestrina,—and of these only one. Bach, had relatiyes who
might be said to have been eminent composers. Since, therefore,
of the whole galaxy of first-rate composers, only one is shown to be
a member of a musically-gifted family, it is obvious that in music
hereditary genius plays a negligible part, the presumption being
that Bach's fame was due to individual circumstances and social
conditions. Galton's other lists cannot inspire confidence either.
Raphael is cited as having one relative worth mentioning, namely,
his father, who was " a painter whose powers were moderate, but
certainly above the average " ; Goethe's father and mother are
given for scarcely as good a reason; and Isaac Newton is thus
illegitimately introduced in one of the lists. Indeed, whether we
analyse Galton's Hereditary Genius, Havelock Ellis's British
Genius, or De Candolle's Histoire des Sciences et des Savants
depuis deux Siecles, we are equally oppressed with a sense that the
I. Galton appropriately says : " I t would seem that discoveries are
usually made when the time is ripe for them, that is to say, when the
ideas from which they naturally flow are fermenting in the minds of many
men." (Hereditary Genius, p. 192.) M. George Sarton, the editor of Isis,
an international review devoted to the history of science, expresses himself
as follows : " C'est l'humanite tout entiere, uniflee par l'enchevgtrement et
l'interdependance infinis des activites individuelles qui invente et qui
progresse. Tout le travail intellectuel de l'humanite est comme le travail
d'un etre unique, infatigable et immortel." (Congres Mondial des Associa-
tions Internationales, Brussels, 1913.) Dr. I. Ioteyko, Director of the Inter-
national Faculty of Pedology, says : " II est hors de doute a l'heure actuelle
que l'inventivite est inherente a l'esprit humain," and looks forward to
" le developpemeiit du talent, voir mfime du genie." (Le Fcedologium,
January to March, 1913, pp. 22-3.) And Benjamin Kidd says in his Social
Evolution, 1898, pp. 270-1 : " Even the ablest men amongst us, . . whose
names go down to history connected with great discoveries and inventions,
have each in reality advanced the sum of knowledge by a comparatively
small addition. In the fulness of time and when the ground has been
slowly and laboriously prepared for it by a vast army of workers, the great
idea fructifies and the discovery is made. It is, in fact, not the work of
one, but of a great number of persons whose previous work has led up to it."
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authors were too fascinated with the Darwinian conception of
human nature and human progress to consider the social factor
adequately and impartially.
Whichever way, then, we regard the problem of genius, we
reach the conclusion that there are no grounds for attributing extra-
ordinary native ability to any individuals, and that there is good
ground for explaining a man's position in the scale of social values
to individual circumstance and to the social trend. Our suspicion
has thus ripened into something like conviction that individual and
racial genius equally owe their existence to cultural factors and
favouring circumstances, and that the anti-evolutionary idea of vast
innate differences between different races, nations, and individuals
is untenable. We are thus spared the need of suggesting insanity
(Galton), imbecility (Havelock Ellis), or abnormal development in
the men and women who represent to us the crests of many an
historico-social wave, and we are not bound any longer to think that
the mass of humanity must for ever live in the swamps and low-
lands of ignorance, pettiness, and superstition.
(b) Talent and Mediocrity. The problem of the origin of talent
is not so simple as it might seem. If each section of society
showed a proportion of talent equal to its numerical importance the
social factor would be necessarily irrelevant to our inquiry. As
it is, not only is the talent contained in each social section in inverse
proportion to its size, but, significantly enough, the more favour-
ably placed a section is, the higher and more persistent are its
achievements. Kings strike the ordinary student as being almost
always immensely superior to peasants. The aristocracy in the
Middle Ages really displayed a vast amount of talent. The gentry
has flooded the positions just below those coveted by the aristo-
cracy. And the well-to-do and educated classes show a surprising
number of successes. Yet, depress the social position of these
classes, or raise the social position of other classes, and astonishing
changes as to capacity appear to come to light. Exactly what we
should expect on the culture theory, and what we know to be true of
peoples as a whole ! It is undisputed that the overwhelming
majority of our Royal Academicians, our leading lawyers,
our members of learned societies, our captains of in-
dustry, and the majority of other men and women
of talent come from the classes which command wealth
and social position, whether hereditary or not; it is
undoubted that, without wealth and social position, it is most diffi-
cult to rise, for the poor man cannot afford either the fees of the
Inns of Courts or the universities, journeys to Italy for the study of
art, or any other of the many expensive ways of mounting the
social ladder, and therefore it seems reasonable to infer that, granted
a wide range of individual circumstances (including enthusiasm
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created for a certain pursuit owing to particular experiences and the
existence of a good opening), we should encounter, as we do, the
picturesque variety of talent in the socially favoured and its absence
in the socially ill-favoured classes.
Actual differences in social standing should not deceive us on
this point, for, to put it cautiously, " i t is not certain that the
average inherent mental and physical qualities of the majority of
the wage-earning classes are not equal to those of the rest of the
population," while " continued family success may be due, in at
least a high proportion of the total cases, to the favourable environ-
ment of the children of the able, to their possession of all the means
of training for success, and to the opportunities and the advantages
secured by a public school and university career, as well as by the
successful position of the father," and " the fact that the poorest
are lowest in the social scale cannot be used as a completely satis-
factory argument that . . . they are the poorest stock," since
" the results, so far as they are concerned, may have been biassed
by conditions that have thwarted natural competence " (A. News-
holme, The Declining Birth Rate, 1911, p. 53, pp. 51-52). In this
connection countries should be compared where the higher educa-
tion is respectively cheap and dear and access to higher posts
respectively easy and difficult.
The statistical method which Karl Pearson's school pursues
does not seem to have yielded as yet any striking results. We
will examine one series of figures to furnish the reader with an
example of the method. The facts under consideration relate to
the 2,459 students at Oxford between i860 and 1892 whose fathers
were educated at the same university, and are discussed in a paper
by E. Schuster and Ethel M. Elderton on The Inheritance of
Ability, published in 1907. Leaving subtlety aside, one would
imagine, on the theory of heredity, that as an almost invariable rule
the fathers of those who took first, second, third, and fourth class
honours had themselves taken similar honours. Instead of this we
find, to give but one illustration, that of the 149 who had been
placed in the first class, 27 only, less than one-fifth, had fathers who
had been themselves in the first class, and that of the 329 second-
class men 52 had fathers in the first class. In short, " of the
fathers of the first-class men, 36^ 2 per cent, obtained either a first or
a second class themselves, and thus were on the whole slightly
superior to those of the second-class men, of whom only 32*2 per
cent, reached this standard " (p. 5). Now, if we remember that
"family circumstances or family traditions influence a man when
he decides on what kind of degree he shall become a candidate "
(p. 11), and that many other social factors are involved, the differ-
ence in the figures, 36"2 per cent, to 32^ 2 per cent., is even smaller
than we should have exj>ected on the culture theory.
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Allowing for individual experience and for social conditions, the
culture theory seems, therefore, quite able to account for the exist-
ence of talent en masse in the socially-favoured classes and scattered
here and there in the socially ill-favoured classes.
(c) Members of the Same Family. In the last section we have
by implication dealt with the large body of untalented persons by
suggesting that the lack of talent is not in themselves, but in their
stars. It is, however, contended that the differences in the mem-
bers of the same family, ' where the environment is demonstrably
homogeneous,' prove beyond a doubt that birth, and not social
advantage, counts. Yet this ' unanswerable ' argument loses its
virtue when we probe the assertion. In a society like ours, adults
have so many opinions and examples placed before them that they
necessarily differ widely. One of these adults becomes father,
another mother; then there are servants, relatives, friends, acquaint-
ances, and strangers, to say nothing of books, each with their
slightly or considerably varied point of view. Manifestly, such an
environment cannot by any stretch of the imagination be regarded
as uniform for a child. If, then, we think of several children in a
family, each of different age, the complexity increases. And to
all this has to be added that since the child's thoughts are uncon-
trolled by the elders, and since the experiences, or even the physical
constitution or health, of no two individuals can coincide, unrelieved
uniformity is of necessity out of the question. The familiar family
argument thus breaks down when examined. Moreover, if we
notice how dirt, coarseness, brutality, superstition, and their com-
peers flourished unchallenged not so many generations ago among
us, and that within the last generation we have witnessed sweeping
changes in these directions, it becomes obvious that the fatalistic
argument of the home is plainly contradicted by the data of history.
In fact, comparing different generations or different parts of a
country, we observe certain customs rigidly universal in one age or
district and rigidly unknown in another. On all points, then, it
seems that the culture theory is not invalidated by the apparently
divergent mentalities in one and the same family of children.
Summing up, therefore, our examination of the origin of the
varying performances of individuals, we seem to be justified in con-
cluding that individual experience and social circumstances offer an
adequate explanation of the observable divergences, and that these
divergences have been vastly exaggerated owing to the preva-
lent hero worship. To put this in the form of a definition : Man
alone possesses the power of absorbing the substantial part of a
highly developed civilisation, together with the ability of advancing
this civilisation to an infinitesimal degree; or, stated more abstractly
and broadly, the stock of humanity's acquisitions, divided by the
number of human beings who have lived, allowing for actual
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physical and social conditions, yields the intellectual, moral, and
practical capacity of the individual. In other words, culture is a
strictly collective product and the individual a strictly social being.
Conclusions, (a) The Darwinian assumption that the amazing
differences in cultural level between the various peoples of the globe
are due, wholly or mainly, to corresponding differences in innate
mentality, and that these in their turn were caused by the selection
of natural and acquired structural modifications, is, as we saw
above, demonstrated by recent research to be as nearly as possible
without any justification in fact. On the contrary, we see now that
culture is solely explicable by culture, and that every people is
innately prepared to adapt itself to any civilisation however high.
This being the case, we are bound to agree that the known differ-
ences in the mentality of individuals not diseased are best accounted
for by the same law of cultural influence, and that human
progress can only be retarded or accelerated through retarding or
accelerating cultural development. Indeed, what structural modifi-
cations are to the advance of animals, cultural modifications are to
the progress of man.
(b) It may be asked. How are these conclusions to be reconciled
with the theory of evolution ? Without making the remotest
attempt at a complete answer, the following sketch of a possible
reply may be given. In the history of man's ancestor, him-
self the most advanced among animals, the time came when
through untoward changes in his environment, he was threatened
with extinction. The only method to save himself was reliance on
unlimited collective thought instead of on a particular structural
outfit determining needs, means, and methods, and thus a double
process of change set in and continued until man replaced his
specific inherited structural outfit by an acquired or cultural one.
These two classes of outfits were in direct opposition to each other,
as fixed heredity does not permit of free adaptability which is the
very life-breath of culture. Accordingly, man came to differ funda-
mentally from all other life in that he was no longer guided by a
series of inherited and fixed needs, means, and modes of pro-
cedure. This explanation is no doubt more or less laboured and
incorrect; but the essential fact remains that man does differ from
plants and animals in the manner specified. So far as culture is
concerned, just because it is a new development, man is as far
removed from the ape as from the fish or even the oak tree, and all
attempts to compare human with animal communities are doomed
to complete failure because of this. Of course, since man is a living
being- nearly related to the apes, he bears certain traces which
connect him with life as a whole; but these traces represent his
general or sub-human nature, and are entirely unconnected with his
unique capacity for, and primary dependence on, culture. Yet all
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this is precisely what we should expect to be the case on the theory
of evolution, and if Darwin failed in his interpretation of human
progress, it was only because he overlooked what was specific in
man. The scanty knowledge and experience of his day relating
to the different races of the world were mainly responsible for his
being misled.
Moreover, not only does the Darwinian conception violently
clash with the facts; but it is inconsistent with our knowledge of
animal life and development. That is, if natural selection had
caused in man the enormous differences observable in individuals,
in groups, and historically, we should be bound to conclude that
equally gigantic differences existed in all species. And yet outside
mankind, in every species, almost complete uniformity and stability
is seen to reign, when all but prodigious periods of time are
focussed. The Darwinian explanation of the origin of culture must
therefore be rejected, precisely bcause it is in conflict with the
general process of organic evolution, whilst our account of the
virtual stability and uniformity of human nature should commend
itself, just because it harmonises with what we know of the whole
of animal life and development. Similarly, granting the method of
culture, we can see how adaptation through habits, customs, con-
victions, and ideals, replaces, and renders superfluous, structural
adaptation. Thus the cultural, rather than the eugenic, theory is
in accord with the fundamental facts of the evolution of living
forms.
(c) Our new view presents man as a modified form of life which
depends on culture so far as it is man. Consequently, without
culture man may be said to be the most miserable and incapable
of beings, and for this reason presumably, not one human being is
known to exist outside the influence of some civilisation. This,
too, implies that, so far as man is cultured, he has profited by the
cultural inventions and discoveries of the whole of mankind, from
pre-paleolithic times to our own. Furthermore, depending essen-
tially on culture for guidance and for the satisfaction of his own
specific nature, and culture tending through the ages towards the
perfect in every department of effort, he himself is really only fitted
for the perfect, and can only feel truly satisfied so far as he is an
integral part of an ideal state of society. Moreover, seeing the
composition of man's nature and the enormous cultural advance
he has thus far made, it seems inevitable that—failing some stellar
catastrophe—he should triumph all along the line and become,
what he is alone fitted for by nature, a cultural being of the highest
insight, refinement, and rectitude.
(d) The culture theory is not without powerful supporters in the
present day. Professor Leonard T. Hobhouse, for instance, lucidly
expounds the root principle of the meaning of human tradition :
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The rudiments of instruction which an ape, a cat, or a bird can furnish
to its young, are limited to a few acts of restraint and encouragement,
supplementing, or rather, anticipating the lessons which individual
experience would teach. In human society, on the other hand, tradition
goes to the root principles of action, both as shaping the ends recognised
as desirable, and as furnishing rules of methods of which but a few could
be found out in the course of individual experience, and those only by
exceptionally gifted or exceptionally fortunate persons. In a word,
tradition as based on the Universal brings the experience of the race
to bear on individual conduct in a new sense. If we are right in holding
that instinct is due to heredity, while heredity works through natural
selection, then, as we have already seen, there is a sense in which instinct
itself utilises the experience of the race to guide the individual. What is
performed at that stage by the constant elimination of tlie majority of
individuals bom, and by the stereotyping of the structure of those which
survive, is executed at this higher stage by the organisation of the
experience of those who have lived, and rests upon the plasticity of those
who learn by it. In short, at this stage, we have organised racial experi-
ence largely taking the place of that hereditary structure which represents
the result of an infinity of conflicting an?, chaotic experiences in past
generations. In fine, in the highest animal species, instinct lays the
ground plan of conduct, within which details may be remodelled by
individual experience. In the human species, the ground plan is itself
reconstituted by the organised experience of the race." (Mind in
Evolution, 1901, pp. 319-20.)
Mr. McDougall says :—
Whereas animal species have advanced from lower to higher levels of
mental life by the improvement of the innate mental constitution of the
species, man, since he became man, has progressed in the main by means
of the increase in volume and improvement in quality of the sum of
knowledge, belief, and custom, which constitutes the tradition of any
society. And it is to the superiority of the moral and intellectual tradi-
tions of his society that the superiority of civilised man over existing
savages and over his savage forefathers is chiefly, if not wholly, Sue.
. . . All that constitutes culture and civilisation, all or nearly all, that
distinguishes the highly cultured European intellectually and morally
from the men of the stone age of Europe, is summed in the word " tradi-
tion." National characteristics, at any rate all those that distinguish the
peoples of the European countries, are in the main the expression of
different traditions. (Introduction to Social Psychology, 1909, pp. 328-9.)
Professor Lloyd Morgan expresses himself as follows: —
Mental progress is mainly due, not to inherited increments of mental
faculty, but to the handing on of the results of human achievement by a
vast extension of that which we have seen to be a factor in animal life,
namely tradition. {Habit and Instinct, 1896, p. 334.) Again : Intellectual
evolution, whether of primary or secondary value, is no longer by incre-
ment of human faculty, but by summation and storage in the environ-
ment it creates. (Ibid, p. 334.)
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These extracts, which could be easily multiplied, leave no doubt
on the matter that well-known thinkers of our day have recognised
the uniqueness of man and accordingly cut themselves adrift from
the Darwinian tradition. Unfortunately, however, apparently not
one of the innovators has gone beyond making a general statement,
when what is required is a detailed examination of the whole
problem and a systematic re-interpretation of human affairs in the
light of present-day knowledge.
The basic error of Darwinian eugenists (Galton and others, as
quoted; also, among a number, J. A. Thomson, Heredity; R. C.
Punnett, Mendelism; S. Herbert, The First Principles of Heredity;
and W. Schallmeyer, Vererbung und Auslese) has been to
assume that culture represents an artificial and unstable auxiliary,
to be replaced without undue delay by permanent organic modifica-
tions, whereas, on the contrary, it apparently embodies an unique
method of nature by which advance through structural change is
rendered superfluous and is almost infinitely transcended. To this
basic error must be attributed the uniform neglect of eugenists to
examine the scope and fundamental significance of culture; their
unsuspectingly regarding socially developed modes of thought and
feeling as heritable; their readiness to take for granted that the
cultural traits of families, classes, peoples, races, and the two sexes,
primarily reflect innate differences; their almost invariable satisfac-
tion, in good faith, with evidence of the flimsiest character, such as
naive references to ' every-day experience ' ; and their insistence
that human progress is to be identified with the evolution of a
super-man, when it is really a question of developing a super-
civilisation. This unfortunate attitude of overlooking the emer-
gence of a new turning on the evolutionary road, has been a dis-
service to the culture theory, for its establishment pre-supposes that
it has successfully passed through the fire of ruthless criticism, an
ordeal by which it has yet to be tested.
(e) Our whole thought relating to human problems is to-day
vitiated by the unwarranted assumption of mental heredity. Leav-
ing aside the larger social issues, such as the struggle for the
emancipation of women, the placing on an equal footing of all races
and classes, the substitution of international law for the appeal to
the mailed fist, the subordination of the senses and the appetites to
a life-ideal, the providing of the fullest opportunities for the
children of all and sundry, which would be automatically solved by
the culture theory, we find mental heredity adduced for the
explanation of every kind of human characteristic. Is some one
methodical or slovenly, pious or sceptical, honest or dishonest,
tenderly parental or otherwise, able or stupid, liberal or conserva-
tive, or is a child eager or lax in his morals or studies,—whatever it
be, mental heredity is supposed to explain it all. It is time, we say.
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that Sociology should definitely clear itself of all complicity in the
dissemination of bare statements involving a belief in mental
heredity, and should settle down to trace cultural variations to
definite cultural conditions before resorting to the theory of
heredity.
(/) With the Darwinian incubus removed. Sociology may
breathe freely at last. Its fundamental basis being unequivocally
determined as human nature depending specifically and funda-
mentally on socially and historically developed culture for self-
expression and self-realisation, it has done with occult, incalculable
and non-social causes—with the innately and strikingly different
mentalities and capricious instincts of different sexes, different
Taces, different nations, different classes, and different individuals—
and may boldly proceed on the assumption that man is strictly a
social being, inconceivable and a nonentity apart from society. If
it be also agreed that man is essentially fitted for, and therefore
only truly satisfied with, the highest civilisation or efflorescence of
culture, and that progress towards a humanity distinguished by the
universal prevalance of the love of fellowship, science, and refine-
ment, is a sober fact, sociologists may be said to possess a reliable
guide in interpreting the past, in understanding and counselling the
present, and in forecasting the future. Their labours will not be
less arduous; but they will work with the consciousness that they
are actively reducing a chaos into a cosmos, a mass of apparently
intractable facts into a self-consistent and self-maintained system of
reality. This will be the beginning of Sociology as a strict science,
for a strict science with its primary unit—in this case the nature of
man—scientifically undetermined, is inconceivable. If, against that,
it be urged, with Gumplowicz, that the social group^ is the sociolo-
gical element, or, with Durkheim, that even the mental categories of
space, time, cause, etc., are social products, the answer is still that
only the unique cultural nature of man makes civilised groups and
universal thought possible, and that it alone explains the wherefore
of collective effort and the whither of social development.
(g) Finally, the present writer ventures to suggest that the
Sociological Society should institute an inquiry having for its
object the determination of the precise sphere of influence of the
collective or cultural, as distinct from the individual or hereditary,
factor in all matters appertaining to the intellectual, moral, aesthetic,
and practical capacities and attainments of individuals and groups
I. It would be more correct to say : Mankind; for as the individual is
the culture-demanding unit, so mankind is the culture-supplying unit. The
family, the mart, and the social group might be regarded as the principal
culture-mediating units.
DARWINISM AND SOCIOLOGY 253
of individuals, the investigators to bear in mind the crucial import-
ance of studying different peoples and members of different classes
under the same cultural conditions (e.g., in school and college), and
vice versa (e.g., by comparing the achievements of blue-eyed
' Aryans' in the mountains of Kurdistan ^ with those of woolly-
haired Africans in the universities of Europe). Such an inquiry
should yield invaluable insight into the causes, the nature, and
the development of social institutions and activities.
G. SPILLER.
I Felix von Luschan, The Early Inhabitants of Western Asia, 1911.
